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COMMUNITY VOICE AND JUSTICE: AN ESSAY ON
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS AS A PROXY FOR CHANGE
BRENDA BRATTON BLOM,* JULIE GALBO-MOYES,**
AND ROBIN JACOBS***
I. INTRODUCTION
After years of working in communities in Baltimore, and
working with community organizations around issues of crime, justice,
and over-incarceration, it has been quite a surprise to encounter a great
deal of resistance among hard-working, progressive-minded lawyers to
the concept of problem-solving courts. Over the past year, the three of
us have attempted to parse this resistance, and make sense of it. As we
write this essay, we attempt to step back and use a broader lens,
though much of our context is locally rooted in Baltimore, Maryland.
This discussion is not just about drug courts, though attempting to
respond to the intertwining of addiction and the law is an important
part of the discussion. This discussion is not just about mental health
courts, though responding to the connection between mental illness
and the law is also an important part of the discussion. Nor is this
discussion just about youth and the courts, or disorder in communities
large and small. This is a larger conversation about how we view our
courts, our communities, and our citizens in our collective search to
provide justice.1
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1. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 711 (1969) ("Justice" is defined as: 1. Moral
rightness; equity. 2. Honor, fairness. 3. Good reason. 4. Fair handling; due reward or
treatment. 5. The administration and procedure of law).
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Our collective disclaimer is that we are not criminal lawyers.
Brenda Bratton Blom has been working in communities for her entire
career, and has represented community groups in Baltimore
neighborhoods that suffer from significant disinvestment since 1993.
Robin Jacobs and Julie Galbo-Moyes are recent law graduates who
participated in the Community Justice Clinic at the University of
Maryland School of Law over a two year period and were part of the
team that authored the amicus curiae brief supporting problem-solving
courts in Brown v. Maryland,2 in which the Maryland Court of
Appeals considered a challenge to the fundamental jurisdiction and
constitutionality of Maryland's problem-solving courts during the
Spring 2009 term.3 Although all of us have an ear turned to the
community voice in this discussion, we were not expecting the level or
tone of criticism which came our way while writing the amicus brief.
The arguments made by some of our colleagues have led us to
re-examine our assumptions. We have come to believe that many of
the criticisms of problem-solving courts are really about something
much deeper-the breakdown of our system of justice. Criticizing the
problem-solving courts may be a proxy for this more fundamental
critique of the system. Repeat court-based actors are desperately
attempting to understand and respond to a much larger problem.
Problem-solving courts have become the straw man for the theoretical
debate about justice systems more generally.
The American Heritage Dictionary defines a straw man as "one
set up as an opponent to be easily defeated or refuted."4 Critics of
problem-solving courts, though they contribute immensely to the
current discussion, use problem-solving courts as a straw man because
they fail to address the real problems with the justice system, no matter
what the docket or diversion. On September 6, 2009, the Baltimore
Sun newspaper ran a story by Julie Bykowicz, entitled the "Public
Defenders' Identity Crisis," that illustrates this premise.5 Although Ms.
Bykowicz interviewed several public defenders ("PDs"), she failed to
capture the broad scope of the struggle over how to engage problem-
solving courts, instead framing the issue narrowly as a struggle
primarily within the Baltimore City Office of the Public Defender. In
2. Br. of Concerned Citizens, Organizations, and Legal Professionals as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Brown v. State, 409 Md. I (Md. 2009).
3. Id.
4. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1274 (1969).
5. Julie Bykowicz, Public Defenders' Identity Crisis: Torn Over Whether to Stop at a
Fair Trial or Seek Help for Clients, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 6, 2009, at 2.
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the article, Ms. Bykowicz describes a public defender who bemoans
having counseled a client to enter into the Baltimore City Felony Drug
Court initiative despite the client's history and the fact that the client
was highly unlikely to succeed.6
Scholars concerned with problem-solving courts often focus on
issues that individual lawyers within the system face, rather than the
crisis in our justice system. The debate within an agency like the
Maryland Office of the Public Defender does not exist in a vacuum.
To understand the complex issues undermining the quality of justice
systems are able to provide, one must attempt to grasp the everyday
realities of life in Baltimore and other urban centers throughout
America.
In 2007, there were 100,000 arrests in Baltimore,7 a city of
631,366 residents.8 While data suggests that approximately one-third
of those arrested were not charged,9 this high number of arrests
resulted in roughly 60,000 court appearances, each requiring a judge,
prosecutor and defender.' 0 And this is only the criminal docket. It does
not begin to deal with all of the family law, contracts, landlord-tenant,
code enforcement of all variety, and other civil legal matters. Adding
up these numbers presents a stark picture of the strain placed on the
judiciary. In 2007, according to the PD's annual report, there were
71,870 cases opened.'' In 2008, the PD's office reported little
change-opening 71,877 cases in Baltimore City.12 It follows that, if
there are an estimated 250 working days when the courts are open, the
PD's office alone must manage 287 cases per day.
The Circuit Court for Baltimore City criminal felony docket is
heard in eight designated courtrooms on a regular basis. On a random
6. Id. at 1.
7. MD. DEPT. OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR. SERVS., ANNUAL REPORT 17 (2006),
http://www.dpscs.state.md.us/publicinfo/publications/pdfs/AnnualReport2006DPSCS.pdf.
8. See U.S CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICK FACTS, BALTIMORE (CITY),
MARYLAND, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/24/2404000.html (last visited on Apr. 5,
2010).
9. This includes those who are arrested without being charged or classified as "abated
by arrest," where the criminal activity was ended by the arrest and required no judicial
intervention or the prosecutor lacked evidence sufficient to support a conviction. Julie
Bykowicz, Police in City Arrest Fewer, BALTIMORE. SUN, Nov. 24 2007.
10. MD. JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS: ANNUAL STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT 77 (2007),
http://www.courts.state.md.us/publications/annualreport/reports/2007/2007_annualreport.pdf.
I1. ELIZABETH JULIAN, OFFICE OF THE PUB. DEFENDER, STATE OF MD: FISCAL YEAR
2009 ANNUAL REPORT 39 (2009).
12. Id.
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day (October 10, 2009), there were 127 cases listed on Baltimore
City's Felony Docket,' 3 which represents approximately sixteen felony
matters assigned in each courtroom that day or, by extrapolation, every
day. This caseload is, of course, impossible to manage. The Court has
responded in many ways, but the most revealing of documents from
the court is the New Criminal Initiatives for Felony Docket 2007.14 On
page three of the report, there is a description of Reception Courts:
The primary purposes of [this] concept are to try cases
as expeditiously as possible and to preclude
postponements within the Felony Trial Courts. In
essence, the two Reception Courts ... are to act as
clearing houses, performing administrative review and
disposing of felony incidents based on the facts
presented, while allowing only ready-to-tr7 felony
incidents to go to our eight felony trial courts.
But most stunning is the assertion that:
Approximately, 4 to 5% of the Reception Courts
workload goes to trial. For example, if our two
Arraignment courts had 100 felony incidents to arraign
in a day, 64 would go to the two Reception Courts. Out
of the 64 three felony incidents (64 X .04 = 2.56 or 3;
64 X .05 = 3.2 or 3) would go to the trial courts. The
rest will be disposed of by the Reception Courts: STET,
Null-Prose, Guilty Plea, Judgment, Sub-curia,
Dismissed, Continued, Postponed, etc. 16
As a result of the court's desire for expediency, there is
tremendous pressure on the attorneys to comply with a system that
simply processes cases to move people through, rather than either
advocating zealously in a traditional model, demanding that the state
make its case, or attempting to deal with the underlying issues that
bring the defendant into the criminal court system.
13. See CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY DAILY DOCKETS,
http://www.baltocts.sailorsite.net/docket/dockets.htm. (last visited on Apr. 5, 2010).
14. John M. Glynn & Marcella A. Holland, Circuit Court for Baltimore City, New
Criminal Initiatives for Felony Docket 2007 3 (2007),
http://www.baltocts.state.md.us/criminal/notices/NC-forFelonyDocket_2007xxdelete.pdf.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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II. How DID WE GET HERE?
For years now, we have attempted to arrest and prosecute our
way out of social issues. A politics of fear surrounding issues of crime
and the War on Drugs' 7 in the 1980s and 1990s led to a retributive and
ineffective model of justice in the United States, including mandatory
sentencing guidelines,18 Three Strikes statutes,1 9 and zero tolerance
policies. 2 For example, two high-profile murder cases led to the
passage of the Three Strikes law in California. 2' In response to public
pressure, politicians who either favored tough-on-crime policies or
were fearful of being labeled "soft on crime," responded with
increasingly harsh punishments22 that devastated low-income
communities. Because the consequences primarily affected
marginalized communities, 23 broader public opinion continued to favor
policies of over-imprisonment despite declining or steady rates of
24
violent crime.
A cognitive dissonance developed between the reality of the
mass incarceration of non-violent offenders and the public perception
that locking these law-breakers away would keep the public safe.
Harsh sentences led to the unconstitutional overcrowding of prisons, 25
increased recidivism, and overextended dockets.26 Far from solving
17. See Melody M. Heaps and Dr. James A. Schwartz, Toward a Rational Drug Policy:
Setting New Priorities, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 175, 179-91(1994) (describing the history of the
"War on Drugs," beginning with the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988).
18. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2006).
19. David Schultz, No Joy in Mudville Tonight: The Impact of "Three Strikes" Laws on
State and Federal Corrections Policy, Resources, and Crime Control, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y. 557, 558-59 (2000).
20. Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary Tale of Criminal
Laws, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 12, 12 (2010); Adam Lamparello, Reaching Across Legal Boundaries:
How Mediation can Help the Criminal Law in Adjudicating "Crimes of Addiction," 16 OHIO
ST. J. Disp. RESOL. 335, 340-51 (2001).
21. Carpenter, supra note 20, at 12-15.
22. Id. at 30-32. While legislators passed the statutes, the judiciary deferred to
legislative intent. Id. at 43.
23. A disproportionate number of African American and Latino men make up the prison
population. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA (2008),
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTSPrisonO8_FINAL_2-1 -
I FORWEB.pdf.
24. THE DISASTER CTR., UNITED STATES CRIME RATES 1960-2008,
http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/uscrime.htm.
25. Carpenter, supra note 20, at 51 (2010).
26. Lamparello, supra note 20, at 347-48.
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public safety issues, these policies overburdened the criminal justice
system.
Given that the politics of privatization have ruled public policy
for the past twenty years, a corporate model also replaced the public
service model in many arenas. For example, profit-motivated private
27facilities replaced public correctional facilities. This shift has had a
negative impact on delivery of justice, both in perception and in
reality. 28 As a result of these retributive policies, state-prison spending
spun out of control, from twelve billion dollars in 1987 to forty-nine
billion dollars in 2008.29 Even with state budget cuts in 2009, private
prison operators continue to see profits. 30 With the retributive system
in place and a private lobby to continue the policies of moving people
through the system, the number of people coming into the courts for
criminal cases continues to increase.
In response to these policies, courts began developing coping
mechanisms, working with innovators across a broad spectrum,
including social workers, mental health experts, and community
organizations to respond to the vastly increased mandates to prosecute
and incarcerate citizens. These innovations included attempts at
diversion, alternative dispute resolution and, as an almost natural
extension, problem-solving courts.
Opponents of problem-solving courts argue that they
undermine the fundamental protections for defendants in our legal
system. The traditional paradigm, in which the accused is represented
by counsel at a trial that is heard by a jury of peers, is a relative rarity
in Baltimore and in any city. While there are jury trials in Baltimore
(there were 5,946 jury trial demands made through the PD's office in
27. Despite the growth in prison privatization, promised cost savings rarely materialize.
See Jennifer Steinhauer, Arizona May Put State Prisons in Private Hands, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
24, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/24/us/24prison.html.
28. In Pennsylvania, judges took kickbacks to send juveniles to private prison facilities.
See Ian Urbina & Sean D. Hamill, Judges Plead Guilty in Scheme to Jail Youths for Profit,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/us/ I 3judge.html.
29. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 12 (2008),
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTSPrisonO8_FINAL_2-I -
IFORWEB.pdf.
30. Kopin Tan, Arresting Developments, BARRON'S, Oct. 19, 2009, available at
http://online.barrons.com/article/SBl25574536753691649.html?mod=BOL-hpp-mag&page=
sp.
3 1. Douglas E. Abrams, Crime Legislation and the Public Interest: Lessons from Civil
RICO, 50 SMU L. REV. 33, 79 n.382 (1996).
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2007 out of the 71,870 cases opened),32 the numbers are small (less
than ten percent of the total number) in contrast with the number of
cases in which agreements are made (a plea is made consistent with
offers made by the prosecutor and accepted either with or without
counsel).
Recent staffing cutbacks in police, prosecutors, public
defenders and the courts has made the push for problem-solving courts
increasingly difficult. In the 2009 Annual Report of the Maryland
Office of the Public Defender, for example, acting PD Elizabeth Julian
noted that the "OPD [Office of the Public Defender] lost 65.5 full time
State positions (including 24 attorney positions) because of cost
containment efforts." 33 This situation continues to vex attempts by
PDs, who are already working above suggested caseload standards, to
take on the representation and defense of so many citizens charged
with offenses. Similar cutbacks have been seen in police departments,
state's attorney's offices, and in the courts. 34 As a result, each of the
agencies charged with justice in our city and in jurisdictions across the
country is stretched thin. Furthermore, the number of offenses that are
charged criminally is increasing regardless of the decrease in
personnel. 35 Given that there are an unprecedented number of people
coming into the criminal justice system, that the courts themselves are
attempting to find some way to manage the volume of matters, and
that we have not been able to transform the problems inside the justice
system into strategic policy debates, we are then left to examine the
ways in which the courts and citizens have attempted to respond.
32. NANCY S. FORSTER, OFFICE OF THE PUB. DEFENDER, STATE OF MD: FISCAL YEAR
2008 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (2008).
33. Elizabeth Julian, State of Maryland Fiscal Year 2009 Annual Report at I
http://www.opd.state.md.us/Index%2OAssets/OPD%20Annual-ReportFY2009.pdf.
34. Joe Follick, Budget Cuts Weighing on the Scales of Justice, Jun. 15, 2008,
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, available at
http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20080615/NEWS/806150589; William M. Welch, Court
Budget Cuts Swift Hand of Justice, USA TODAY, Apr. 1, 2010, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-03-31-court-cuts_N.htm; Bernard Schoenberg,
State Police Plan Massive Layoffs, HQ Closures, THE STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER, Mar. 23,
2010, available at
http://www.sj-r.com/news/x99764408/State-Police-plan-massive-trooper-layoffs-to-close-
five-districts.
35. In 1984, when the federal criminal code was rewritten, there were 25,000 federal
crimes. They were organized into one volume, and published. There are now estimated to be
over 250,000 federal crimes, and no one even knows where they are all located. See John S.
Baker, Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes, LEGAL MEMORANDUM I (The
Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.), June 16, 2008,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Legallssues/upload/Im-26.pdf.
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A. Mediation within the Criminal Justice System
One way the court system responded to overwhelming
caseloads was to implement programs that provide alternatives to
litigation like pre-trial mediation.36 Pre-trial mediation, drawing on the
success of interracial community conflict resolution,37 provided a less
adversarial option for certain litigants before proceeding with the case
in court. The shared goal of mediation programs linked with the
courts was to avoid overwhelming dockets by diverting cases that are
more appropriate for a less adversarial, brokered solution.39 Diversion
through mediation programs faces some of the same criticisms that
other restorative justice and problem-solving models face.40
A key response to each of these criticisms, however, is that the
programs operate as a voluntary, rather than mandatory, option to
litigants where the facts of the case are not in dispute and the parties
are willing to work out a solution.4 1 Therefore, the parties involved are
never forced to sacrifice their constitutional rights. No one argues that
a party with a legitimate dispute should forego their constitutional
rights or the advice of their attorney in favor of a court diversion
program. As Chief Judge Bell of the Court of Appeals of Maryland
states, "In Maryland, we know that mediation is not a anacea. It is not
always appropriate, and it does not always work." Instead, when
mediation programs are appropriate, they provide the opportunity to
"help people in conflict develop the skill to sit down together, to
deepen their understanding of the underlying issues, and to work on
36. The American Bar Association defines mediation as "a form of alternative dispute
resolution in which the parties bring their dispute to a neutral third party, who helps them
agree on a settlement." http://www.abanet.org/publiced/glossary-m.html#mediation
37. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Staying in Orbit or Breaking Free: The Relationship of
Mediation to the Courts Over Four Decades, 84 N.D. L. REV. 705, 710 (2008).
3 8. Id.
39. Id. at 708-09.
40. See Tina S. Ikpa, Balancing Restorative Justice Principles and Due Process Rights
in Order to Reform the Criminal Justice System, 24 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 301, 311-17
(2007) (addressing the various criticisms of mediation and restorative justice techniques). See
also Frank V. Williams, Reinventing the Courts: The Frontiers of Judicial Activism in the
State Courts, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 591, 667 (2007) (arguing that mediation and other similar
problem solving approaches represent a nefarious new type of judicial activism to control
individual behavior).
41. See Maureen E. Laflin, Remarks on Case-Management Criminal Mediation, 40
IDAHO L. REV. 571, 608 (2004)
42. Robert B. Kershaw, Access to Justice in Maryland - A Visionary's Model, 37 MD.
B.J. 50, 53 (2004).
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creative win-win solutions." 43 When we talk about justice for all in the
modem sense, it is predominantly this type of result that we intend to
achieve; whether it is achieved by a trial or by a mediation does not
matter as much as the fact that justice is ultimately achieved.
In Maryland, integration of pre-trial mediation efforts into the
court system has enjoyed a high level of success.44 From community-
based conferencing that works on and strengthens pre-existin
community assets, to school-based conflict resolution programs,
diversionary efforts supplement the work of the courts by allowing
parties to resolve conflict without ensnaring them in the confines of
the overstretched court system. Even with mediation and diversionary
efforts, however, a large number of cases still overwhelm the court
system.
B. Problem-Solving Courts
Problem-solving courts, another restorative justice technique,
were developed to address concerns that the criminal justice system
merely recycles offenders without either resolving the underlying
issues prompting them to commit offenses in the first place or
addressing their needs for basic services and support.46 A traditional
problem-solving approach typically involves a flexible judicial
response tailored to meet the needs of each defendant, integration of
social service providers, and aggressive judicial monitoring, including
the use of sanctions. 47 Specific areas of focus in a problem-solving
court may include drug abuse (both adult and juvenile), mental health,
domestic violence, homelessness, truancy, prostitution, misdemeanor
quality-of-life crimes, and community courts. 48 Since the problem-
solving court model originated with drug courts, which seek to provide
addicted offenders with treatment in lieu of incarceration, these
specialized dockets remain the most widely proliferated and heavily
43. Id. (quoting Bell, C.J.).
44. MARYLAND MEDIATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION OFFICE, BRIDGING PEOPLE
TOGETHER: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN MARYLAND, FISCAL YEAR 2004 IN REVIEW (2004),
http://mdcourts.gov/macro/pdfs/reports/annualreportfy04.pdf
45. Id.
46. GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATr, GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-
SOLVING JUSTICE 3 (2005).
47. Id. at 5-6.
48. Community Courts are those courts with identified jurisdiction that serve a specified
geographic area using problem solving methods. See, e.g., Terry Carter, Red Hook
Experiment: In This Brooklyn Neighborhood. Justice Has a Distinct Community Flavor, ABA
J., June 2004, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/red-hookexperiment/.
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researched. 49 Baltimore became one of the first cities to develop a drug
treatment docket in 1994, and Maryland has established approximately
forty additional drug courts since its inception.50  In 2002, the
Maryland judiciary established a commission to further develop these
specialized drug dockets and establish uniform principles to govern
their operation.
The connection between reducing overcrowded dockets and a
program that potentially involves intensive judicial supervision
depends on its effectiveness in reducing recidivism. National studies
have confirmed that participants in adult drug treatment courts
generally had significantly lower rearrest and reconviction rates than
non-participants, as well as a longer time period preceding their first
recidivism event.52 While drug court programs are generally more
expensive than conventional case processing due to their intensive
judicial monitoring and treatment services, the net monetary benefits
of reduced recidivism exceed these costs by decreasing future arrests
and their corresponding costs to the criminal justice system, as well as
decreasing costs to potential crime victims in property, health care, and
quality of life.53
Evaluations of Maryland's drug courts have revealed similar
results. Participants in the Baltimore City Adult District and Circuit
Court drug treatment dockets in particular were rearrested 31.4 percent
49. The National Drug Court Institute (NDCI) identified 3,204 problem-solving courts
in the United States at the end of 2007. See C. WEST HUDDLESTON, Ill, ET AL., NAT'L DRUG
COURT INST. PAINTING THE PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES I (May 2008). Of these, 2,147
were drug courts, including 1,174 adult drug courts, 455 juvenile drug courts, six campus drug
courts, and five Federal District drug courts. Id. at 4. The remainder of drug courts addressed
family dependency (301 courts), Driving While Intoxicated (110 courts), reentry (twenty-four
courts), and tribal courts (seventy-two courts). Id. See also BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE,
DEFINING DRUG COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS 1, 4 (2004),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/DrugCourts/DefiningDC.pdf. (recommending ten key
principles for drug courts to follow).
50. HUDDLESTON, ET AL., supra note 49, at T.3.
51. Maryland Judiciary, Office of Problem-Solving Courts,
http://www.courts.state.md.us/opsc/index.html.(last visited Jan. 5, 2010).
52. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ADULT DRUG COURTS: EVIDENCE INDICATES
RECIDIVISM REDUCTIONS AND MIXED RESULTS FOR OTHER OUTCOMES, 44-49 (2005),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05219.pdf. While limited data was available to evaluate post-
program performance, the existing data showed that significant reductions in recidivism
persisted beyond the duration of the program. Id. at 52.
53. Id. at 72-73. See also HUDDLESTON, ET AL., supra note 49, at 6-7 (stating that "drug
courts significantly reduce crime rates on average of approximately 7 to 14 percentage points"
and "cost an average of $4,333 per client, but save $4,705 for taxpayers and $4,395 for
potential crime victims, thus yielding a net cost-benefit of $4,767 per client").
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fewer times than those in the national comparison model over a three-
year period.54 Indeed, the Baltimore City Circuit Court Adult Drug
Court had a graduation rate of 40.8 percent from 2002 to 2007
(compared to the national average for adult participants of 33.4
percent).55 While the corresponding adult drug treatment docket in the
Baltimore City District Court only achieved a graduation rate of 24.2
percent, program evaluators claim that the participants' grave
substance abuse and criminal history profiles make the drug court
56program one of the nation's most severe. By utilizing treatment
programs rather than incarceration, Baltimore's adult drug treatment
courts incurred 24.2 percent less in criminal justice system costs than
the comparison sample over a three-year period, for a projected
savings of 2.7 million dollars. 57
1. Problem-Solving Court Critiques
Despite these successes, problem-solving courts have
encountered a host of criticism throughout their expansion. These
critiques include fears that problem-solving courts harmfully affect the
adversarial process.5 8 Critics also argue that the problem-solving
movement encourages police to pursue offenders committing low-
level quality-of-life crimes that the system would typically overlook.59
Other opponents worry about judicial impartiality when the same
judge who engages in the problem-solving team approach must
suddenly revert to the traditional adversarial process at a probation
termination hearing.6 0
Critics of drug courts in particular also highlight the selection
process, which often screens out high-risk offenders, offering the
option of probation with drug treatment to first-time and nonviolent
offenders only.61 While the latter group has a higher likelihood of
54. MARYLAND JUDICIARY: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS IN MARYLAND 6-7 (2007).
55. Id. at 11-12.
56. Id. at 12.
57. Id. at 7.
58. GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, supra note 46, at 180.
59. BERMAN & FEINBLATr, supra note 46, at 174. See also Steven Zeidman, Policing the
Police: The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 316-17
(2004-2005) (arguing that the focus on quality-of-life crimes that accompanied the "Broken
Windows" theory - also a foundation of the problem-solving court movement - prompted
mass arrests for low-level offenses as a pretext for investigating more serious crimes).
60. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 46, at 185.
61. Maryland's Felony Drug Court Dockets now only work with offenders who have
significant criminal justice histories, though still focused on non-violent offenders. See DAVE
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successfully completing treatment, critics argue that persistent
offenders' needs are the most vital.62 Some argue that drug courts
coerce defendants to choose a guilty plea, drug treatment, and the
immediate freedom that accompanies the drug court program over
waiting in jail to litigate a claim with an uncertain outcome.63 Finally,
critics fear that sentences imposed after failing drug court may exceed
the prison term accompanying a standard plea for the same offense,
although studies of Baltimore's drug court participants have shown
that they spent fewer days in jail than the control group processed in
conventional court. 64
Adopting best practices, such as requiring a different judge to
preside over probation termination hearings to ensure judicial
neutrality, could assuage many of these concerns.65 The Red Hook
Community Justice Center ("Red Hook"), a model problem-solving
court located in New York, has adopted new policies regarding
information sharing: defendants meet with their defense attorneys first,
who order existing social workers' reports. The prosecutor does not
include this information in her report, and nothing is entered into the
record until sentencing. If the defendant successfully completes the
program, the case is dismissed before sentencing, and nothing accrues
on the record. 67 As Maryland's problem-solving courts evolve, they
should likewise continue to refine their policies and procedures to
incorporate best practices like those of Red Hook.
While evaluation is essential for the development of best
practices in any evolving field, critics must use the justice system as it
currently exists as a baseline of comparison, rather than an idealized,
theoretical paradigm. It will better serve justice to carefully distinguish
CRUMPTON ET AL., NPC RESEARCH, COST ANALYSIS OF BALTIMORE, MARYLAND DRUG
TREATMENT COURT 21 (2003), available at
http://www.npcresearch.com/Files/Baltimore%20City%2ODrug%2OCourt%20Analysis.pdf.
62. NAT'L. Ass'N. OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, AMERICA'S PROBLEM-SOLVING
COURTS: THE CRIMINAL COSTS OF TREATMENT AND THE CASE FOR REFORM, 23 (2009),
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cdd02b415ea3a64852566d6000daa79/665b5fa3 I f96bc4085
2574260057a81 f/$FILE/problem-solvingreport-I 10409_629(K+PMS3145).pdf [hereinafter
NAT'L. Ass'N. OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS].
63. BERMAN & FEINBLATr, supra note 46, at 178.
64. Id. at 177.
65. NAT'L. ASS'N. OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, supra note 55, at 28
66. Greg Berman & Aubrey Fox, From the Benches to the Trenches: Justice in Red
Hook, 26 JUST. Sys. J. 77, 77 (2005), available at
http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/Justice.pdf
67. Interview with Public Defender and Prosecutor, Red Hook Justice Center (Sept. 25,
2009).
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flaws inherent to problem-solving courts from those endemic to the
current system as a whole with its extensive reliance on plea-
bargaining.68 This is particularly applicable when the criticism
involves coercive plea setups or the impact of problem-solving courts
on the adversarial process, especially in a post-adjudication court such
as Maryland's adult drug treatment courts. The Maryland and
California drug court models provide useful insight into how the court
system has adapted in response to these criticisms as well as the effect
the courts have on the community.
2. Maryland's Model: Probation Problem-Solving
While concerns about a defendant's individual rights in
problem-solving courts draw impassioned criticism,69 Maryland's use
of post-conviction probation for drug court prevents many of the
commonly-cited due process concerns. Like many drug court models,
offenders entering Maryland's drug treatment courts plead guilty and
receive a suspended sentence, which may be reinstated should the
defendant fail to successfully complete the drug treatment program.
This post-conviction model has gained popularity nationwide. The first
wave of problem-solving adult drug court programs primarily
employed a diversionary or pre-plea framework. However, today only
seven percent of these programs are diversionary, while seventy-eight
percent only serve offenders at a probationary or post-conviction stage
of adjudication. 70 One rationale for this shift may be a prosecutor
preference for the post-plea model, as many contend that delayed
68. News stories are replete with examples of system failures from both sides. For
example, a recent crime victim lamented the early release of her attacker due to a plea deal of
her attacker caused by overcrowded dockets. Peter Hermann, Victim Told Rock-Solid ID of
Attacker Isn't Enough, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 20, 2010,
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bal-
md.hermann20jan20,0,2502168.story. Two days later, National Public Radio (NPR) ran a
story about Shadu Green, charged with a series of misdemeanors, who could not afford to
make bail and faced an impossible decision between pleading guilty for a crime for which he
claims innocence, or staying incarcerated until a trial date months later to fight the charges.
Laura Sullivan, Inmates Who Can't Make Bail Face Stark Options, Jan. 22, 2010,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=122725819&fit-I&f-3. The story notes
that more than a half-million inmates face this choice daily. Id.
69. Indeed, concerns about violations of the defendant's individual rights in our current
system of plea bargaining draw the same kind of impassioned criticism, and mirror the
complaints lodged against problem-solving courts. Jeff Palmer, Abolishing Plea Bargaining:
An End to the Same Old Song and Dance, AM. J.CRIM. L. 505, 518-29 (1999).
70. HUDDLESTON, ET AL., supra note 49, at 4-5. Fifty-nine percent of adult drug courts
are strictly post-plea, while nineteen percent serve offenders at both the pre-plea and post-
conviction stages of adjudication. Id.
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judgment could result in lost witnesses or stale evidence.7 1
Additionally some argue that convicted participants also have more at
stake and ostensibly, increased motivation to successfully complete the
program.72 Any due process issues potentially trigered by the unique
operation of the traditional drug court model7 lose salience after
sentencing. The fact that participants in post-conviction programs
retain the more limited due process rights afforded probationers, rather
than criminal defendants, permits drug courts to legally carve out a
space between the adversarial processes of sentencing and probation
termination within which problem-solving methods may proceed.74
The participants' probationary status also avoids implicating
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment,75 which protects
defendants in a criminal proceeding against multiple punishments for
the same offense. Double jeopardy does not attach in disciplinary and
probation, parole or bond revocation proceedings because such
proceedings are not concerned with adjudicating guilt or innocence for
76 7
the previously committed offense. In Brown v. State, the Maryland
71. COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPERATIONS, NEW YORK CITY BAR, THE IMMIGRATION
CONSEQUENCES OF DEFERRED ADJUDICATION PROGRAMS IN NEW YORK CITY 3 (2007),
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/Immigration.pdf. But see NAT'L. ASS'N. OF CRIMINAL
DEFENSE LAWYERS, supra note 62 (arguing that prosecutors' fears are "largely overstated"
since most drug court evidence-police testimony, surveillance and physical evidence-will
remain unaffected by delay and prosecutors can require defendants to waive their rights to a
speedy trial).
72. NAT'L. ASS'N. OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, supra note 62, at 3.
73. Critics express concerns that include the collaborative approach in which judge,
defender, and prosecutor work as a team to promote successful treatment and the possibility of
jail time as a sanction. Eric Lane, Due Process and Problem-Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM
URBAN L.J. 955 (2003).
74. Probation, as "a matter of grace," does not afford probationers the same procedural
protections as those granted to a criminal defendant at trial. See Smith v. State, 306 Md. 1, 6,
506 A.2d 1165, 1168 (1986). See also State v. Rogers, 170 P.3d 881, 886 (2007)
("Intermediate sanctions imposed in (problem-solving courts] do not implicate the same due
process concerns, and continued use of informal hearings and sanctions need not meet the
procedural requirements articulated" in Morrissey v. Brewer for probation termination
hearings).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1, cl. 2.
76. United States v. Miller, 797 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. McInnis, 429
F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2005) (double jeopardy not to apply to revocation of supervised release
because it is considered part of the original sentence); United States v. Carlton, 442 F.3d 802,
809 (2d Cir. 2006). See also Gibson v. State, 328 Md. 687, 690 (1992) (quoting Clipper v.
State, 295 Md. 303, 313 (1983)) (The revocation of probation is "not a second punishment
added upon the original sentence; it represents rather, the withdrawal of favorable treatment
originally accorded the defendant."). Probation is, by definition, conditional; the defendant is
on notice that breaching those conditions may lead to the reinstatement of his original
sentence. Clipper v. State, 295 Md. 303 (1983). Thus, criminal behavior during a probationary
period can be grounds for both successful criminal prosecution by the court and revocation of
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Court of Special Appeals affirmed that the use of brief incarceration as
a drug court sanction does not violate double jeopardy, stating "[i]f a
probationer violates the conditions of his probation, the court may
revoke the probation and 'direct execution of all or any part of the
sentence it had previously imposed but suspended.'" 8 Therefore,
Maryland's drug court model avoids implicating many double
jeopardy and individual rights concerns.
C. California's Model: Expanding the Availability of Treatment
California's courts responded to the critique that drug courts
were self-selective 79 by broadly expanding the reach of its program. In
an effort to capitalize on the economic successes of the drug court
model, California enacted Proposition 36, otherwise known as the
Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000 (SACPA), which
addressed the "skimming" concerns by making probation with drug
treatment universally available to all qualified drug offenders.
Before the enactment of SACPA, California's drug courts offered
intensive drug treatment to an average of 3,000 carefully selected
participants per year; approximately 36,000 drug offenders receive
probation with drug treatment annually under SACPA.8'
This unprecedented expansion of drug treatment as a punitive
alternative did not duplicate the regularly scheduled status hearings
before a judge that characterize the conventional drug court model.
Under SACPA, the role of the judge is minimized; after drug treatment
is initiated, the probation department primarily supervises SACPA
probation for a violation based on the underlying facts. See Dunn v. State, 65 Md. App. 637
(1985), rev'd on other grounds, 308 Md. 147 (1986).
77. Brown v. State, 181 Md. App. 735 (Md. App. 2008), aff'd, 409 Md. 1 (2009).
78. Id. at 8-9 (quoting Cathcart v. State, 397 Md. 320, 326 (2007)). See also JUDGE
WILLIAM G. MEYER, NATIONAL ASS'N OF DRUG COURT PROFESSIONALS, CONSTITUTIONAL AND
OTHER LEGAL ISSUES IN PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS 26 (2008) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL
AND OTHER LEGAL ISSUES].
79. See CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 78, at 12 (discussing the
criticism that drug court programs selectively choose participants most likely to succeed).
80. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210, § 3063.1, CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 10.8. In
passing SACPA, California emulated Arizona's Drug Medicalization, Prevention and Control
Act (Proposition 200) passed in 1996 to divert first and second time nonviolent drug offenders
into treatment rather than incarceration.
81. See Q & A on New UCLA Report on Prop. 36 (Drug Policy Alliance, Sacramento,
Cal.), http://www.prop36.org/Q&AUCLAreport.html [hereinafter Drug Policy Alliance]. In
contrast, 1,849 participants entered Maryland drug courts in Fiscal Year 2007. MD. JUDICIARY:
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PROBLEM SOLVING COURTS IN
MARYLAND 5 (2007).
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participants via quarterly progress reports received from drug
treatment providers. 82 Only after receiving word that the participant is
"unamenable to ... drug treatment" of all forms may the probation
officer move to revoke probation. 83 SACPA participants who twice
either violate a drug-related condition of probation or who are arrested
for non-violent drug possession face mandatory probation revocation if
the state proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
is not amenable to drug treatment.84 In a termination hearing for a
third drug-related offense, the defendant loses SACPA eligibility if the
state proves the probation violation.85 Thus, SACPA differs from
traditional drug courts by constraining judicial discretion to this
"three-strikes" formula. Courts also may not impose "shock
incarceration" penalties for noncompliance by briefly incarcerating
participants for setbacks such as a "dirty" urine test. Many California
86judges objected to these judicial limitations, and on July 12, 2006,
Governor Schwarzenegger si ned Senate Bill 113787 into law, which
allowed "flash incarceration" of SACPA participants. The law has
never taken effect, however, since advocacy roups sued and received
an injunction shortly after the bill's passage.8 f
While proponents speculate that SACPA has resulted in
substantial savings in incarceration costs-the approximate cost of
drug treatment for one participant is $3,333 while the cost of a year's
imprisonment is $30,9299 -the recidivism rate for SACPA
participants did not match that of California's more selective and
intensive drug courts,9 1 and many participants who elected SACPA
82. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(c).
83. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1 (c)(2).
84. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1 (e)(3)(B). In determining this, "the court may consider .
whether the defendant (i) has committed a serious violation of rules at the drug treatment
program, (ii) has repeatedly committed violations of program rules that inhibit the defendant's
ability to function in the program, or (iii) has continually refused to participate in the program
or asked to be removed from the program."
85. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1 (e)(3)(C).
86. See Alex Ricciardulli, Getting to the Roots ofJudges' Opposition to Drug Treatment
Initiatives, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 309 (2003).
87. S.B. 1137, 2005 Leg., 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).
88. "Flash incarceration," like "shock incarceration," refers to brief incarceration of
drug treatment participants for setbacks such as failing a urine test.
89. See Gardner v. Schwarzenegger, No. RGO6-278911, 2006 WL 4717840 (Cal. Sup.
Sept. 14, 2006).
90. Drug Policy Alliance, supra note 81.
91. DOUGLAS LONGSHORE, ET AL., CALIFORNIA HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. AGENCY,
EVALUATION OF THE SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND CRIME PREVENTION ACT: 2004 REPORT 30-32
(2005),
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never showed up for treatment at all.92 Proponents associate drug
courts' higher recidivism rates with their more scrupulous selection of
participants.9 3 Counties that reportedly used one or more of the
recommended drug court procedures promulgated by the National
Drug Court Institute, however, did experience higher drug treatment
attendance rates. 94
Critics of SACPA analogize the program to the tacit
legalization of drug use, contending that it merely recycles participants
through the system without the substantive successes of traditional
drug courts in addressing the underlyinF addiction via intensive
supervision and meaningful sanctions. It is unclear whether
SACPA's minimal judicial involvement, decreasing the pressures of
burgeoning dockets and overcrowded prisons, comes with a price in
the form of social costs associated with higher recidivism rates.
Moreover, the program has suffered funding setbacks. One outcome
seems clear: with sufficient financial backing, such a program does
have the potential to compel the development of drug treatment
resources within communities. This is clearly in line with many of the
desires of those who oppose the courts taking a therapeutic orientation.
Pushing treatment into the community-with monitoring by state
agencies-might well satisfy the criticisms of some who oppose drug
court initiatives.
III. CONCLusIoN
The underlying dilemma remains: What role should, and can,
courts and the formal justice system play in sorting out problems that
are essentially social problems? How can courts distinguish social
problems, which cannot be "solved" in a court process, from criminal
acts that require a response from the criminal justice system? The fact
that we are asking these questions suggests that being poor, being
http://www.uclaisap.org/prop36/documents/lI 2344%20SACPA%20FINAL%202003%20REP
ORT%20092304.pdf (citing SACPA treatment completion rates of approximately thirty-four
percent for SACPA's first and second years and fifty-five percent for California's drug courts
as reported by the California Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs in 2005).
92. Id. at 53 (reporting "show rates" for treatment of over eighty percent in two-thirds of
the counties (less than twenty percent of participants failed to appear) and less than fifty
percent in one-fifth of the counties (approximately half failed to appear for treatment)).
93. Id. at 30.
94. Id. at 53.
95. Jack Riley, et al., Drug Offenders and the Criminal Justice System: Will Proposition
36 Treat or Create Problems?, RAND, at 6-7 (2000), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/issue-papers/IP204/IP204.pdf.
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addicted to drugs, or having a mental health issue is a good predictor
that you will have an encounter with the criminal justice system.96
A system of restorative justice is the most complex justice
system to build. Restorative justice aims to restore the one (person or
community) harmed to as good a position or better as before the harm
was done. This is a fairly straightforward idea; yet, in many ways it is
inconsistent with our basic system of justice, where once something is
classified as a crime, the state owns the harm and the goal is not
restoration of the one harmed, but instead punishment of the offender.
While we do, in some instances, have provisions for restitution,
restoration for the offender and the community is not generally the
goal.
The criticisms lodged at restorative justice and problem-
solving solutions miss the mark because they take a narrow view of a
system dealing with broad problems. Critics view restorative justice
techniques as ineffective, undemocratic,98  and the cause of
constitutional violations of defendants' rights.99 While many articles
address these concerns about restorative justice techniques,10 we need
to take a broader view to truly understand the problems facing our
courts.
All the criticisms of problem-solving courts-that they violate
due process rights, that they fail to rehabilitate, or that they represent a
form of undemocratic reform-apply to the reality of the court system
today. It is the overcrowded dockets caused by the retributive policies
adopted during the 1980s and 1990s, a period characterized by politics
of fear that led to the concerns that restorative justice critics present. A
look at non-restorative justice court proceedings shows a stark picture:
a commonplace waiver of individual rights, backdoor plea deals in lieu
96. K. Babe Howell presents a good summary of the challenges of having decided to use
aggressive or "zero tolerance" policing to deal with social disorder and disordering behavior in
communities. He artfully articulates the costs to communities, individuals and the larger state
of using criminal processes to deal with low-level disruptions in communities. See K. Babe
Howell, Broken Lives From Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-
Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 271 (2009).
97. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Rehabilitation Ideal and the Drug Court Reality, 14
FED. SENT'G REP. 172 (2001-2002).
98. See Williams, supra note 40, at 706.
99. James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving and the Meaning
ofJustice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1559 (2003).
100. Mary E. Reimund, Is Restorative Justice on a Collision Course with the
Constitution?, 3 APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 31 (2004); See also lkpa, supra note 40, at 311-18
(2007); Peggy F. Hora, Drug Treatment Courts in the Twenty-First Century: The Evolution of
the Revolution in Problem-Solving Courts, 42 GA. L. REv. 717 (2008).
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of open jury trials, prison sentences without hope of rehabilitation, and
a system whose burdens undemocratically fall disproportionately on
marginalized communities.10 1 Problem-solving courts and mediation
arose in response to these fundamental problems facing the judiciary,
and, while still evolving, offer hope to ameliorate some of the harsh
results of over-incarceration. In this way, proponents of restorative
justice and problem-solving techniques and critics of those same
techniques come from a common place of concern about how the
current system often misses the needs of individual defendants and
communities.
Many who work within the legal system tightly cling to
tradition, even when it no longer serves our citizens. The adversarial
system of trials-long celebrated in our popular and legal culture-
represents an ideal that is rarely achieved in today's overstretched
courts. While we do not suggest that this formal adversarial process is
never appropriate, it should, perhaps, be one of many forums for
seeking justice. It should, perhaps, be part of a continuum of justice
alternatives.
Our processes have not and cannot remain the same over time.
What worked for one set of population numbers cannot necessarily
work for a set of numbers three and four and five times that. We have
choices to make. We can change the baseline laws and remove many
things that are currently seen as crimes from our criminal frame
(prostitution and drug use, for instance). We can move some practices
into different kinds of tribunals (specialized dockets, dispute resolution
in the communities or other non-traditional venues). We can provide
housing, drug treatment, and employment for those who complete their
sentences, to help them re-integrate into their communities, 2 thereby
reducing recidivism.
Maybe we can do all of these things. But what we cannot
afford to do is to process cases in the same way that we are attempting
to do now. What is currently happening in our courts and communities
is madness. We are dehumanizing and demoralizing millions of people
whose primary crime was to be born poor and of color in this country.
Those who have been involved in problem-solving courts are
desperately aware that this is true, and are attempting to change
systems to respond to this reality. We now have best practices from the
101. See infra Part I.
102. Eric Eckholm, Battling Addiction With Those Who Know It Best, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/23/us/23drugs.html?r- I &pagewanted=print.
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National Association of Drug Court Professionals,'0 3 the National
Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys,' 04  the National
Association of State Courts,ios and others. This is the time to take the
wisdom of all those involved in the system and in our communities to
make the changes reflect the best of our system, and of our country,
and work to improve the lives of our citizens.
While it is critical to improve all the systems that have the
capacity to strip citizens of rights and liberties, it is also important to
remember that our system of justice includes all of us. We must all be
working to solve conflicts and to seek justice. This is essential to
democracy. The task of solving conflict cannot be assigned to lawyers
and judges alone. Community members and family members have a
stake in the outcome at all levels of a dispute. Building the capacity of
those who are not lawyers and judges increases our capacity to live in
a just society; it does not diminish that capacity. The straw man is
dead. Best practices exist. We should together focus on the underlying
issues of building and guaranteeing justice in America, one person and
one community at a time.
103. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, DEFINING DRUG COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS
(2004), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/DrugCourts/DefiningDC.pdf.
104. NAT'L. Ass'N. OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, supra note 62.
105. PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT'L. CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, PROBLEM-SOLVING
JUSTICE TOOLKIT: THE PROBLEM SOLVING COURT APPROACH FOCUSES ON DEFENDANTS AND
LITIGANTS WHOSE MEDICAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO RECURRING
CONTACTS WITH THE COURT SYSTEM (2007),
http://www.ncsconline.org/d-research/Documents/ProbSolvJustTool-Bro-v4.pdf.
